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1. See CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN CONGRESS AND COURTS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE
FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 281-82 (2006). There have been many law
review symposia on the subject. E.g., Conference, Fair and Independent Courts: A Conference
on the State of the Judiciary, 95 GEO. L.J. 897 (2007); Judicial Independence and Democratic
Accountability 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Summer 1998); see also Amy B. Atchison,
Laurence Tobe Liebert & Denise K. Russell, Judicial Independence and Accountability: A
Selected Bibliography, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 723 (1999).
2. See generally John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining
Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1999).
3. TATHA WILEY, ORIGINAL SIN: ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, CONTEMPORARY MEANINGS 114
(2002). One need not choose between St. Augustine and Immanuel Kant as to the source of
“the human proclivity toward evil as self-love or the instinct of self-interest.” Id. Whatever its
source, the proclivity is real and a universal problem for judges and those who judge judges.
4. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
5. “The most vital ingredient ... was ‘intellectual rectitude’; judges must ‘support their
I. A DEFINING CHALLENGE
The independence of the judiciary is an enduring and defining
objective of the legal profession. We lawyers, of all citizens, have the
greatest stake in shielding judges from intimidation or reward. And
that task of protecting judicial independence stands today at the
very top of the agenda of the American legal profession.1
The integrity of law and legal institutions requires more than just
the protection of judges. It is equally dependent on the willingness
and ability of judges to maintain virtuous disinterest in their
work.2 Some might explain their occasional failings as manifesta-
tions of the original sin inherited from Adam;3 whatever their
source, the proclivities of judges to indulge or celebrate themselves
are perpetual temptations and judicial self-restraint is a perpetual
challenge. As Cardozo explained: “The great tides and currents
which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and
pass the judges by.”4
A primary and indispensable constraint on those who judge is the
moral constraint imposed by the professional community to which
they belong. The primary function of transparency in proceedings at
trials and arguments, and of published decisions and opinions
explicating judges’ rulings, is to manifest their disinterest not only
to the parties whose contentions they judge, but also to their
lawyers, who share responsibility for imposing moral judgment on
the professionalism of judges.5
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judgments with that degree of candor’ that will provide ‘adequate disclosure of the real steps
by which they have reached where they are.’” John Braeman, Thomas Reed Powell on the
Roosevelt Court, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 143, 150 (1998) (quoting Thomas Reed Powell, Some
Aspects of American Constitutional Law, 53 HARV. L. REV. 529, 549-50, 552 (1940)); see also
Michael Boudin, Judge Henry Friendly and the Mirror of Constitutional Law, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 975, 988 (2007).
6. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 297-302 (1996) (explaining early perceptions of the role of the federal
judiciary); Herbert Jacob, The Courts as Political Agencies: An Historical Analysis, 8 TUL.
STUD. POL. SCI. 9 (1962) (explaining the judiciary’s evolution). Roberto Unger may overstate
the problem, thus:
[T]he policies by which the modern lawyer wants to justify his elaborations of
the law tend either to become abstract to the point of meaninglessness or to
appear as expressions of an effort to manipulate all rules so as to further the
arbitrary preferences of particular interest groups. 
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL
THEORY 210 (1976).
7. See Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and
Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 909, 915-16 (2007).
Judicial disinterest may have been made increasingly difficult in
the twentieth century by the replacement of legal formalism with a
legal realism that commissions judges to be less constrained by
preexisting texts and more attentive to the social consequences of
their judgments.6 A secondary effect may be to inflate the collective
vanity of the judiciary. The greater freedom judges assert in taking
account of the social consequences of their decisions, the harder it
may be for them to lay aside their personal political preferences, the
related interests of their friends and allies, and the adoration or
hostility of a public that either celebrates or attacks them, depend-
ing on the reaction to the policy consequences of their decisions.
There is, to be sure, no empirical evidence of this effect, but it is
reasonable to suspect that it occurs and contributes to public
concerns about possible excesses of judicial independence.
As judicial virtue has become more difficult to practice, it has
become more in need. The present and rising mistrust of the
American judiciary is not a direct consequence of the change in legal
philosophy, but there is an obvious connection. As judges have
increasingly and openly presumed to shape our polity, citizens who
disagree with their politics have felt justified in mistrusting their
disinterest and challenging their independence.7
It is also increasingly difficult for citizen-lawyers performing their
duty to judge the judges to maintain their own disinterest. One form
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8. In 2006, state commissions removed twelve state judges and another eleven resigned
in the face of disciplinary proceedings. Pamela A. MacLean, Transparency Varies Among
States, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 18, 2008, at 18; see PREBLE STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES: THE
INVESTIGATION OF ROSE BIRD AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT (1981) (providing a
poignant account of the 1978 proceeding in California to judge its Supreme Court in a
professionally responsible way).
9. MacLean, supra note 8, at 19 (quoting Charles Gardner Geyh); see also JAMES J.
ALFINI, STEVEN LUBET, JEFFREY SHAMAN & CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND
ETHICS § 1.04 (4th ed. 2007) (chronicling the history of developments in state law in the
second half of the twentieth century).
10. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 9, § 1.13.
of widely shared human weakness is that which inclines citizen-
lawyers to link their respect and support of judges to their own
preferences about the outcomes of the cases and political issues
judges decide. But another is uncritical fidelity to the judiciary. A
failure by the profession to criticize judicial misdeeds deprives
judges of the sense of moral accountability to their peers that is
sometimes needed to reinforce their capacity to know and restrain
themselves. Judging judges wisely, like judging cases wisely,
requires self-knowledge, self-discipline, and moral courage on the
part of citizen-lawyers and their professional organizations.
Effective moral reinforcement of the disinterest of judges by
lawyers requires a system of judicial accountability to deter and
punish misconduct that exhibits disrespect for citizens or their
rights. Laws are needed both to govern judges’ conduct and to
provide occasions for judging them. The presence of such legal
processes reminds lawyers of their duties and alerts judges to the
existence of a judgmental profession. Such laws have been and are
evolving in many state judicial systems. Since 1980, 336 state court
judges have been removed as a result of disciplinary proceedings.8
As Charles Geyh has affirmed, the states are “light years ahead of
the federal judiciary” in dealing with misconduct of judges.9 Belated
progress has been made in the federal system,10 but there remains
no system of accountability for the misdeeds of Supreme Court
Justices other than the impeachment process.
This Essay aims to define a role for citizen-lawyers in advocating
and protecting the independence of judges, and especially the
independence of Justices of the Supreme Court, who increasingly
exercise political power, and who are subject to no personal
accountability whatsoever for the social and economic consequences
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11. We apologize for directing our attention here solely to federal courts, which generally
receive so much more academic attention than do the state courts that decide many, many
more cases. Our excuse for this misdirection is that it enables us to address a wider audience,
but one less likely to be usefully influenced by academic utterances. See Robert S. Thompson,
Comment on Professors Karlan’s and Abrams’ Structural Threats to Judicial Independence,
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 559, 562-63 (1999).
12. PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA 64 (1990).
13. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 43 (Bantam Books 2004) (1776).
14. See generally id.
of their decisions.11 The more we confer such political power on our
judges, the more important it is that there be a system of disinter-
ested accountability to correct their nonpolitical misdeeds and
maintain their awareness of their own mortal limitations. Such a
system or process is first a reminder to the profession of its respon-
sibility for addressing judicial sins, and then a reassurance to the
public that even Justices are accountable to law. The reform
proposed below will not alone reverse the trend of mistrust of the
federal judiciary that presently alarms many citizen-lawyers, but it
would help.
A. The Founding Vision
The moral challenge of judicial independence is not new. It may
help the reader to consider its presence in the early days of the
Republic. The distance in time may help to maintain our own
disinterest in assessing alternatives.
The American War for Independence was, the reader knows,
initiated and led by a Continental Congress comprised in large part
by lawyers presenting themselves as citizens practicing selfless
civic virtue, that is, as advocates for the long-term interest of those
they purported to serve.12 Heartened by their shared sense of high
purpose and professional commitment, Thomas Paine optimisti-
cally proclaimed their achievement: “LAW IS KING.”13 Paine’s
revolutionary vision was that legal texts could and would express
the intent of those governed so that disinterested judges could rule
in the name of the governed as well as in the name of law, and thus
would gain the acceptance and support of those whom they judged.14
The Declaration of Independence protested, among other grievances,
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15. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 11-12 (U.S. 1776). “He has obstructed the
Administration of Justice by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers.
He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone for the Tenure of their Offices, and the
Amount and Payment of their Salaries.” Id.
16. E. Lee Shepard, George Wythe, in LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 1779-1979, at 749 (W.
Hamilton Bryson ed., 1979).
17. His biographies are IMOGENE E. BROWN, AMERICAN ARISTIDES: A BIOGRAPHY OF
GEORGE WYTHE (1981); WILLIAM CLARKIN, SERENE PATRIOT: A LIFE OF GEORGE WYTHE (1970);
ALONZO THOMAS DILL, GEORGE WYTHE: TEACHER OF LIBERTY (1979); ROBERT BEVIE KIRTLAND,
GEORGE WYTHE: LAWYER, REVOLUTIONARY, JUDGE (1982); Robert Kirtland, George Wythe, in
24 AM. NAT’L BIOGRAPHY 92 (John A. Garraty & Mark C. Carnes eds., 1999); Shepard, supra
note 16, at 749.
18. BROWN, supra note 17, at 36.
19. Id. at 35 (quoting Dice Roberts Anderson, The Teacher of Jefferson and Marshall, S.
ATLANTIC Q., Oct. 1916, at 333).
20. Id. at 254.
21. Page v. Pendleton, WYTHE’S REP. 211 (Va. 1793) (invalidating a law of the
Commonwealth purporting to extinguish debts owed to English creditors).
the failure of the king to provide the colonials with an independent
judiciary whom they could trust to respect their legal rights.15 The
Founders implicitly promised to correct this failing.
But what is it that federal judges and Justices should be “inde-
pendent” of, other than a malevolent king? The Founders’ answer to
that question was never clearly stated, and their obscure text and
its intent remain contested issues in contemporary discourse.
Some of the Founders fully understood that the judicial independ-
ence on which the rule of law depends is derived from the moral
courage and professional self-discipline of judges. Only those
qualities enable them to discount not only their own interests but
those of their friends and political allies. George Wythe, the first
American law professor,16 for instance, provided a premier example
of the virtuous judge who could command respect on the regal scale
that Paine had anticipated.17 Classically minded Virginians com-
pared Wythe to Aristides, “the Just.”18 It was said of him, and
apparently never questioned, that “[a] dirty coin [never] reached the
bottom of [George] Wythe’s pocket.”19 Perhaps best remembered as
the law teacher to Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, and Henry
Clay, Wythe concluded his career as the Chancellor of Virginia.20
Acting in that capacity, he was among the first judges ever to
invalidate legislation as inconsistent with the higher law expressed
in Virginia’s Constitution.21 He rendered that courageous judgment
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22. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How To Remove a Federal Judge,
116 YALE L.J. 72, 104 (2006) (discussing the public perception that judges were controlled by
British royals).
23. See ALLEN D. BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE ELIZABETHAN AGE 47-48, 191-92
(2003) (describing his celebrity status). See generally CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION
AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE (1552-1634) (1956).
24. BOWEN, supra note 23, at 370-90 (detailing the story of his dismissal).
25. See EVELINE CRUICKSHANKS, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION (BRITISH HISTORY IN
PERSPECTIVE) (2000) (offering a full account of the event).
26. Act of Settlement of 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, 3 (Eng.) (“[J]udges commissions [shall]
be made quamdiu se bene gesserint, and their salaries ascertained and established; but upon
the address of both Houses of Parliament it may be lawful to remove them....”). Edward Coke
had earlier stated his view regarding behavior justifying removal of a judge: abuse of office,
nonuse of office, and refusal to perform duties. Henry v. Barkley, (1956) 79 Eng. Rep. 1223,
1224 (K.B.).
27. See NIEVES MATHEWS, FRANCIS BACON: THE HISTORY OF A CHARACTER ASSASSINATION
(1996) (detailing the event and contending that Bacon was innocent).
28. Id. at 6.
alone, knowing that the law he invalidated had favored the interests
of his friends and political allies in the revolutionary movement and
benefited some of those despised English against whom the
Revolution had been waged.
Colonial judges were perceived to be intimidated by the royal
government,22 and the revolutionary lawyers had sensed their lack
of judicial independence. They often had in mind the celebrated
Edward Coke,23 who had been dismissed by King James I for his
stated disregard of royal preferences in the decision of cases brought
before the king’s courts.24 The Glorious Revolution of 1688 had
brought King William and Queen Mary to the throne as monarchs
who agreed to disown the executive power over the judiciary
exercised by King James.25 The Act of Settlement of 1701, agreed to
by the monarchy, declared that their judges would serve for the
period of their “good behavior” and be removable only by address of
Parliament.26
The Founders were also familiar with the experience of Francis
Bacon. His term as Chancellor of England came to an early end in
1621 when he confessed to committees of Parliament and the House
of Lords that he had received financial assistance from claimants
whose claims he had upheld.27 They accepted the familiar wisdom
that power corrupts and knew that corruption takes diverse forms.28
But without pausing during a time of war to study the issues
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29. E.g., VA. CONST. (signed June 29, 1776).
30. RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG
REPUBLIC 7 (1971).
31. U.S. CONST. art. III; see also Prakash & Smith, supra note 22, at 88.
32. See Prakash & Smith, supra note 22, at 88-128 (examining use of the term in
eighteenth century England and in the colonies). But see James E. Pfander, Removing Federal
Judges, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227 (2007).
33. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, with Act of Settlement of 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, 3
(Eng.).
34. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 9, § 15.05.
35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
presented, those writing constitutions for new American states29
drew from the Act of Settlement the term, “good behavior” as the
standard for the removal of a misbehaving judge.30 The Founders
also later used the term in Article III of the U.S. Constitution.31
The term “good behavior” had been in common usage in England
at the time of the Act of Settlement,32 but Article III of the Constitu-
tion, unlike the Act of Settlement, provides for impeachment in lieu
of parliamentary address as the action to be taken by the legislature
to remove a judge.33 Address may reasonably be taken to impose less
disapproval and humiliation on the addressee than does the term
“impeachment.”34 But Article III does not specify the standards of
“good behavior” that would immunize a judge from impeachment
and removal from office or distinguish the standard for removal by
impeachment from the standard for removal by address.
Only in Article II does the Constitution specify “high crimes and
misdemeanors” as the standard to be applied in a proceeding to
impeach and remove an officer of the executive branch.35 A question
never definitively resolved is whether the Article II standard applies
to the impeachment of an Article III judge, or, if so, what might
constitute a misdemeanor for the purpose of removing one who
holds office for the duration of his or her “good behavior.” Some
federal judges speak of themselves as serving lifetime appoint-
ments; others more modestly say that they serve only as long as
they are well-behaved. 
There are clear differences between a judge and an executive
officer that might seem to call for a difference in the standard to be
applied by Congress when it considers its responsibility for remov-
ing an officer of an “equal branch” of the same government. Officers
of the executive branch governed by Article II are subject to a
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36. See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, Constitutional Futility of Statutory Term Limits for
Supreme Court Justices, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES 385, 386 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006).
37. See generally REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
(Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006); Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the
Supreme Court, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2007).
38. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY 55-68 (1999) (delivering an
account of his chief justiceship).
39. Id. at 56.
measure of accountability to the electorate and to the President,
whereas Article III judges are not. An ill-behaved President will
meet his or her doom on election day, whereas an ill-behaved federal
judge will not. That is one reason that officers of the executive
branch were not expected to maintain the disinterest required of the
judge. Executive officers must be expected in the performance of at
least some of their duties to respond to diverse influences that are
certain to taint the purity of their motives in performing public
service. For these sound reasons, the Founders probably intended
to hold judges to a higher measure of accountability than Congress
for official behavior that is “not good” even if it is not a “high crime
or misdemeanor.”
Article III of the Constitution does not speak explicitly to the
possibility of age or term limits imposed by law. It is widely
assumed that such limits are not within the power of Congress.36 We
have elsewhere contended otherwise.37 But merely assuring judges
the “life tenure” of royalty, if the Constitution did so, hardly assured
their fidelity to law anymore than it assured the king’s fidelity to
law. The fidelity of judges to law requires strong self-restraint. That
morality can dissolve if it is not reinforced by a moral climate
maintained by the profession of which they are a part. And judges
who lack “life tenure” can be expected to practice courageous fidelity
to law in order to maintain the respect of the citizen-lawyers with
whom they work and of the public they serve. 
Thomas Cooley was a notable example of a judge greatly re-
spected for his integrity. He won the respect of the profession and
the public soon after he was elected in 1865 as the first Republican
justice of the Supreme Court of Michigan.38 One of the first opinions
he wrote for his court cost several of his fellow Republicans the
offices they thought they had won.39 The case presented the question
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40. People v. Blodgett, 13 MICH. 127, 163 (1865).
41. Id. at 173.
42. Cooley was nevertheless defeated in his campaign for reelection in 1885 as a result
of a democratic landslide. For an account of that event, see George Edwards, Why Justice
Cooley Left the Bench: A Missing Page of History, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1563 (1987).
43. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (allowing for the impeachment of “all civil Officers of the
United States”).
44. See supra note 26.
whether Michigan’s constitutional provision limiting the right to
vote to state residents invalidated the legislative enactment that
enabled Union soldiers on duty in the South to vote by mail.40
Regretfully, he explained that departing from the plain meaning of
the words of the state constitution would loosen “the anchor of our
safety.”41 In deciding the case on the basis of a close formal reading
of a preexisting text, Cooley’s decision won the admiration of
citizens of diverse politics as a signal of their court’s integrity.42
But, alas, who can say for sure that Justice Cooley was not self-
serving? Perhaps he sacrificed the jobs of his friends in order to win
an accolade for himself. Would it have been a misreading of the
statute to treat a soldier on temporary military duty in the South as
still a “resident” of Michigan? Given our inevitable human failings,
no judge, whether elected or appointed for life, can be expected to
achieve perfection in suppressing all their impulses to behavior
that is not “good.” Law, at least in the United States, is no science.
Citizen-lawyers therefore have a duty not only to reward with
reverent respect those judges who, like Wythe and Cooley, overcome
their self-serving and power-wielding instincts; they must also
tolerate a reasonable measure of human failing by those appointed
to practice the art of conforming their decisions to the expectations
of their profession.
Still, power does corrupt. At some point on the variable scale
of temptation, a judge’s professional self-discipline fades. The
Founders’ vision imposes on Congress a duty to join in stripping
judicial power from those who have succumbed to temptation or who
are unable to perform their job.43 As Lord Coke himself asserted,
when it is clear that judges are not performing their offices or are
using them for their own purposes, it is time that they be replaced.44
And it is inevitably a task for the citizen-lawyer and the legal
profession not only to support and defend judges whose conduct in
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45. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
46. For reflection on the occasional tendency of federal judges collectively to share the
human failing leading to self-aggrandizement, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
47. See infra notes 52-53, 86-103 and accompanying text.
48. MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, at 139
(1976) (noting that one-fourth of colonial lawyers fled in the “Tory exodus”).
office is within the limits of normal and expected human failings,
but also to share responsibility when the time has come to punish
or remove one who openly abuses or neglects the office. Moreover,
one may reasonably infer from Article III that Congress has a
constitutional duty to legislate reasonable standards of judicial
conduct.45
Alas, self-interest infects the decisions of groups as well as
individuals. Professions, like college fraternities or sororities,
alumni groups, labor unions, or trade associations, are given to
group advancement even if it is sometimes at the expense of the
larger ideals of the American dream, such as the general public
interest. To avoid betrayal of larger public interests, citizen lawyers
and federal judges46 need a healthy skepticism that cautions against
the advancement of the legal profession at the expense of the public
it is licensed to serve. The requisite sense of professional responsi-
bility for the exercise of moral judgment on judicial conduct has
sometimes been lacking even among the leadership of the profes-
sion.47
1. The Federalists’ “Ark of Safety”
Members of the founding generation soon encountered the
difficulties of judging the judges they had appointed for the period
of their “good behavior.” Notwithstanding the composition of the
Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention, there was
in the late eighteenth century, a shortage of Americans who were
“learned in the law.” Many colonials trained in law had been
loyalists and had fled to Canada or abroad early in the Revolution.48
Those who remained were men of strong and conflicting political
views. Although Tocqueville would, within a few decades, designate
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49. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 297-306 (Henry Reeve trans.,
1966).
50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
51. An eloquent statement of the problem published in 1848 is that of Frederick Grimké,
a justice of the Ohio Supreme Court. FREDERICK GRIMKÉ, CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE NATURE
AND TENDENCY OF FREE INSTITUTIONS 420, 420 (2d ed. 1968). Grimké concluded that
if it is not wise to confer a permanent tenure of office upon the executive and
legislative,” he concluded, “it should not be conferred upon the judiciary; and the
more so, because the legislative functions which the last perform is a fact
entirely hidden from the great majority of the community.... The term of
[judicial] office, therefore, should be long enough to enable the public to make a
fair trial of the ability and moral qualities of the incumbent; and not so long as
to prevent a removal in a reasonable time, if he is deficient in either.
Id.
52. 2 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 42-43
(1965).
53. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 160 (2004).
54. Id.
them as an American aristocracy of sorts,49 their profession was not
at all times highly regarded by other citizens.
Notwithstanding disclaimers in the Federalist Papers that the
courts were the “least dangerous” branch of the new government,50
it was soon widely recognized by others that American courts and
the legal profession were, in the founding scheme, political institu-
tions that were not concerned solely with the correct enforcement of
preexisting legal rights.51 The New Hampshire judiciary serves as
a striking example of widespread mistrust of the legal profession.
Some of that state’s judges made no pretense of being trained as
lawyers. John Dudley, a farmer, was elected to the state’s supreme
court and served from 1785 to 1797.52 He urged jurors to disregard
the talk of lawyers; he instructed them to “[b]e just and fear not.”53
As far as the law was concerned, he said: “It is our business to do
justice between the parties ... not by any quirks of the law out of
Coke or Blackstone, books I never read, and never will, but by
common sense and common honesty between man and man.”54 In a
famous charge to a jury, Justice Dudley said:
You have heard, gentlemen of the jury, what has been said in
this case by the lawyers, the rascals! ... They talk of law. Why,
gentlemen, it is not the law we want, but justice. They would
govern us by the common law of England.... Common sense is a
2009] PROVIDING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR JUSTICES 1117
55. MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, at
57 (1976) (quoting Justice Dudley); see also WILLIAM PLUMER, JR., LIFE OF WILLIAM PLUMER
154 (1857). Justice Dudley’s jurisprudence had an English ancestry in the utterances of the
Levellers. See CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION
REVISITED 230-32 (1997).
56. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
57. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 51.
58. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
59. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829,
at 11-38 (1997).
60. See id. for a discussion of the failings of Judge Pickering and Justice Chase.
61. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 1.
62. Id. § 2.
much safer guide.... A clear head and an honest heart are worth
more than all the law of all the lawyers.55
Nothing in the text of the Constitution prevented the appointment
of Justice Dudley to the federal bench or to the Supreme Court.
Could his jury instruction be viewed as sufficiently short of “good
behavior” for a federal judge that he might be punished or removed
from office in compliance with the text of Article III? Plainly in
Justice Dudley’s court, “Law was not King.”56 A judge or a Justice,
sitting in a court of law, who intentionally and often disregards
controlling legal texts in this way should be chastised. And those
who should do the chastising are citizen-lawyers who lead their
profession and whose political preferences might have been
advanced by such judicial misconduct, although this has seldom
happened.
The federal courts authorized by the Constitutional Convention
in Philadelphia were intended in part to correct the indifference to
law observable in the courts of some states.57 But as David Currie
described, the federal courts established by the Judiciary Act of
178958 soon became what he regarded as “the most endangered
branch.”59 This was so because some of the Federalist judges also
manifested a disregard for law, if less openly than Justice Dudley.60
The structure of the original federal judiciary is pertinent to the
issues presented. The 1789 Act established the Supreme Court as
a body of six Justices.61 A district court was established for each of
the thirteen states and one judgeship was created for each district
court.62 Those courts were authorized to hear and decide admiralty
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cases, minor criminal cases, and a few other matters.63 Three circuit
courts, each serving multiple states, were created to exercise
appellate jurisdiction over the district courts, and original jurisdic-
tion in civil diversity cases, major criminal cases, and those in which
the United States was a party.64 Each circuit court was to be staffed
by two of the six Justices and one of the district judges from within
the circuit;65 Justices were thus required to be itinerant in a time
when their travel was by horse, wagon, or sailing vessel. The
apparent purpose of this arrangement was to reduce the risk of self-
advancing, lawless decisions in trial courts by submitting cases to
three judges, not one. The full Supreme Court was to hear appeals
from circuit court decisions only in those civil cases in which the
amount in controversy exceeded two thousand dollars and from
decisions of the highest state courts in cases raising federal
questions.66
In the early decades of the new nation, the people to be governed
had scant personal contact with this federal judiciary, and this
would long remain so. All early federal courts had very short
dockets.67 Few citizens of moderate means found occasion to invoke
either the diversity or admiralty jurisdictions. There were very few
federal criminal laws to be enforced, but their enforcement often
resulted from politically heated matters.
The Constitution forbade treason,68 reflecting the Founders’
concern about the loyalty of a diverse and disconnected citizenship.
That concern was soon validated when citizens in the part of North
Carolina that later became the state of Tennessee declared the
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independence of their State of Franklin and sought the protection
of the King of Spain.69 The leader of that effort would not only
escape prosecution, but would also be elected the first Governor of
Tennessee.70
Also among the early treason prosecutions were those resulting
from the Whiskey Rebellion of 1791-94.71 Farmers in several states,
who protested a federal tax on the sale of their one marketable
product, conducted the insurrection.72 The rebellion was most bitter
in western Pennsylvania; President Washington and the Secretary
of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, led an army to suppress the
uprising.73 Two participants found to have been violent were
convicted of treason, but were later pardoned by the President.74
In 1794, Congress, concerned about citizens embarking on private
invasions of Florida and Louisiana, enacted a presidential procla-
mation known as the Neutrality Act.75 It prohibited citizens from
“invading and plundering the territories of a nation at peace with
the United States.”76 That prohibition was frequently violated. In
1796, William Blount, a Jeffersonian Senator who represented the
new state of Tennessee, was impeached by Federalist adversaries.77
He was charged with actively inciting Creek and Cherokee Indians
to assist the British in conquering the Spanish territory of West
Florida in alleged violation of the 1794 Act.78 Blount was expelled by
a 25-1 vote of the Senate,79 but before the impeachment was
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resolved, he fled to Tennessee.80 Later, he presided over Tennessee’s
legislature and was never prosecuted.81 Neither was Alexander
Hamilton, who in 1800 was openly planning a seizure of New
Orleans that was not approved by the Adams administration.82
Meanwhile, in 1793, Congress enacted a change to the Judiciary
Act to respond to the Justices’ complaints about the burdens of
“circuit riding” resulting from their duty to attend the occasional
proceedings in distant courts.83 The change cut the burden on each
Justice by one-half, not by appointing more judges to handle the
small caseload, but by reducing the number of Justices expected to
sit on the circuit courts from two to one. As a consequence, circuit
courts became two-judge courts with the itinerant Justice pre-
siding.84 The district judge sitting with the Justice usually assumed
a modest role unless the sitting Justice chose to defer to his lesser
colleague.
In 1794, the bar and the public recognized that District Judge
John Sullivan was insane or at least too alcoholic to attend court.85
The first judge appointed to the federal district court in New
Hampshire by President Washington, he had twice served as
governor of that state.86 To correct his unfortunate situation,
Congress took the questionable step of transferring all the jurisdic-
tion of his district court to the circuit court for his region.87 But
Sullivan was not impeached, and he remained on the federal payroll
as a judge of a court lacking jurisdiction.88
Upon the death of Judge Sullivan, Congress reestablished the
jurisdiction of the district court for New Hampshire,89 and the
position was given to John Pickering, a former member of the
Constitutional Convention and, at the time, chief justice of the state
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and thus a colleague of Judge Dudley.90 At the time of his appoint-
ment to the federal bench, efforts had been mounted by New
Hampshire lawyers to remove Judge Pickering (but not Judge
Dudley) from his office on the state court for the same reason of his
insanity.91 His condition may also have been associated with
alcoholism or perhaps with superannuation.92 An attempt to remove
him from office in the state court had failed by one vote in the New
Hampshire House of Representatives.93 The cause for concern about
his work habits as his state’s chief justice was set aside in the belief
that he could bear the very light workload of the federal district
court.94 So he was appointed by President Washington to a federal
judgeship in order to relieve the New Hampshire bar and legislature
of a problem.95
A similar series of events marked the career of Samuel Chase.
While representing Maryland in the Continental Congress during
the Revolution, Chase had compromised military secrets for per-
sonal gains in the flour market.96 This misconduct deprived him of
his role in that Congress.97 In 1788, after the war, Chase, despite his
misdeed, was appointed to head Maryland’s criminal court in
Baltimore.98 But in 1794, he was indicted by a Maryland grand jury
for abusing his judicial authority.99 Alexander Hamilton said of him
at the time that he had “the peculiar privilege of being universally
despised.”100 But his indictment never came to trial. Instead, he was
appointed by President Washington to the Supreme Court of the
United States.101 Chase’s appointment, like that of Pickering, was
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apparently made at the request of local lawyers who perceived that
he would do less harm, at least to themselves and to the people of
Maryland, if he served on a distant multi-judge federal court, in
which he might be less free to indulge inappropriate impulses.102
For a time the behaviors of both Judge Pickering and Justice
Chase gave rise to no serious complaints, but Chase’s self-control
dissolved when he conducted trials of defendants accused of holding
and expressing political views contrary to his own.103 The potential
role of federal judges as Federalist political partisans was exposed
for all to see.
In 1798, the Federalist Congress, anticipating war with France,
enacted four laws designated as the Alien and Sedition Acts.104 And
in 1799, concerned about citizens negotiating private trade rela-
tionships with France, Congress prohibited negotiations with other
nations on behalf of the United States without authorization.105
Chase and many of his fellow Federalists perceived themselves as
a deservedly ruling class and many reacted strongly against the
ongoing class struggle in France as one indirectly threatening to
themselves.106 The Sedition Act proscribed, among other misdeeds,
speech disrespectful of themselves as public officeholders, but not
speech disrespectful of Vice President Jefferson, who happened not
to be a Federalist.107
Chase presided over the case of Thomas Cooper, an English
immigrant charged with criminal sedition.108 Cooper was eminent
both as a physician and as a lawyer and was also a journalist in
Pennsylvania.109 He supported the presidential candidacy of
Jefferson and had published an unflattering account of President
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Adams.110 In Cooper’s trial, Justice Chase went beyond the conten-
tions of the prosecutor, and, in open disregard of common law
standards,111 informed the jury that Cooper was guilty.112 Then, with
the assent of the subordinate district judge, he sentenced Cooper to
six months in jail, a judgment not subject to appellate review.113
Justice Chase then presided over the trial of John Fries, who
was indicted for treason for impeding the efforts of federal tax
collectors.114 The tax that Fries and others protested was the Direct
House Tax on houses, land, and slaves enacted to pay for national
defense against a French invasion that some Federalists antici-
pated.115 Congress imposed the tax in 1798, along with the Alien
and Sedition Acts.116 It was called a “window tax” because the tax
liability of homeowners in nonslave states was measured by the size
of their windows.117 The dispute over the tax was also known as a
“hot water war” because some women poured water from their
second floor windows on tax collectors who came to their front
doors.118
In 1794, Fries had participated in the Whiskey Rebellion.119
Later, in 1799, he led a group of sixty armed men who threatened
the tax collectors seeking to enforce the Direct House Tax.120 He
imprisoned three revenue agents overnight and seized their
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papers.121 When some of his men were in turn imprisoned, Fries led
an armed posse to the United States Marshal’s office; the intimida-
tion secured their release.122 President Adams ordered the Army to
take control, and in 1799, it succeeded in arresting Fries, along with
forty others.123 When charged with treason, he admitted the factual
allegations, but denied disloyalty to the United States.124 In the
trial, Justice Chase refused to allow Fries’s lawyers to argue to the
jury that his actions were not treason and the lawyers accordingly
withdrew from the case. Their client was then convicted and Chase
sentenced him to death.125 President Adams, appalled by Chase’s
conduct, pardoned Fries.126
In an 1800 case, James Callendar was charged with sedition for
his denunciation of President Adams.127 Justice Chase refused to
excuse a juror who acknowledged before trial his certainty of
Callendar’s guilt.128 Without giving a reason, he refused to allow the
defendant’s principal witness, John Taylor of Caroline, a notable
Jeffersonian, to testify.129 Chase was also reported to have inter-
rupted, badgered, and insulted defense counsel.130
For these and perhaps other reasons, Chase was indeed much
despised. He was disowned by President Adams when he cam-
paigned for reelection in 1800.131 An effort to remove Justice Chase
or to constrain him from his extreme partisan misconduct and
brutality was never mounted by the Federalists in Congress or by
the (Federalist) Attorney General. Meanwhile, also in 1800, Judge
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Pickering again became a frequent absentee from work.132 His clerk
reported to the circuit court that he had become insane and was not
performing his job.133
These events helped Jefferson’s party—then known as the
Democratic-Republican Party134—sweep the Federalists out of most
elective offices, except for those serving in New England.135 But the
outgoing Federalist Congress and President Adams addressed the
reality of their defeat in the first weeks of 1801 with the Midnight
Judges Act.136 That Act added sixteen circuit judgeships (one for
each state); these judges would sit on the circuit courts with
jurisdictions extended to the constitutional limit.137 The Act also
reduced the number of Justices from six to five.138 But before that
provision took effect, a sixth Justice, John Marshall, was appointed
and confirmed, apparently in the hope that this overstaffing would
prevent the incoming President from making any appointment to
the Court.139 And all the new judgeships were quickly filled with
loyal Federalists who had lost their offices in the election.140
Federalist Governeur Morris explained that his party was “about
to experience a heavy gale of adverse wind.”141 Therefore, he asked,
“Can they be blamed for casting many anchors to hold their ship
through the storm?”142 Martin Van Buren, no admirer of Morris,
later referred to this event as the creation of an “ark of future
safety” for Federalist politicians.143 Felix Frankfurter and James
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Landis later concluded that the 1801 Act “combined thoughtful
concern for the federal judiciary with selfish concern for the
Federalist party.”144 What Frankfurter and Landis probably had in
mind as an expression of “thoughtful concern for the federal
judiciary” were the Act’s provisions putting an end to so-called
circuit riding by Justices and empowering the new circuit judges to
disqualify a district judge from deciding cases if they found him to
be incapacitated.145 This power was promptly exercised to move
Judge Pickering into a state of compensated retirement.146
Given the partisan self-serving effect of the Midnight Judges Act,
its repeal by the new Democratic-Republican Congress came as no
surprise.147 But the repeal drew criticism from St. George Tucker,
the first scholar of constitutional law and a supporter of President
Jefferson.148 He argued that it was unconstitutional to terminate
sixteen well-behaved district judges by simply abolishing their
judgeships.149 The Act, he said, threatened “the fundamental pillars
of free governments” by threatening the job security and independ-
ence of judges.150 His argument was considered and rejected by both
Houses of Congress and by the President. In 1979, David Currie
gave a somewhat diffident endorsement to Tucker’s protest; he
concluded that “[f]inding new places for a few extra judges may be
a fair price to pay for judicial independence.”151
Had the Act of 1801 creating those offices been less audacious,
and had there been any need for the additional judges, the argu-
ments of Tucker and Currie might have greater force.152 But they
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disregard the larger context of the Midnight Judges Act, which was
an insult to the integrity of the nascent federal judiciary because the
Act was used for the personal advantage of the judges they ap-
pointed. That legislation, it is important to emphasize, was enacted
after the Federalists had already lost the election.153 Its manifest
purpose had nothing to do with the duty of Congress and the
President to maintain an independent judiciary or secure faithful
enforcement of law, but was quite the opposite; its self-dealing was
intended to capture offices in the federal judiciary for rejected
officeholders.154 To preserve the judicial offices newly created under
those prevailing circumstances would have served as an acceptance
of the right of lame duck Congressmen to use the judicial branch,
not only as a place of employment of defeated politicians, but for
the purely political aim of prolonging their unwelcome political
influence.155 The forceful contrary argument is that citizen-lawyers
defending the integrity of the judiciary should have insisted, as
many did, on the repeal of the unseemly Act of 1801.
Although that repeal had the perhaps unintended effect of
restoring Judge Pickering to the bench,156 no judge was punished for
making a substantive decision disapproved by Congress.157 Tucker
in his 1803 treatise, notwithstanding his previously expressed
concern about the Act of 1802, celebrated the federal Constitution
as the first to recognize the “absolute independence of the judiciary”
as “one of the fundamental principles of the government.”158 He
optimistically explained that “the violence and malignity of party
spirit, as well in the legislature, as in the executive, requires not
less the intervention of a calm, temperate, upright, and independent
judiciary.”159 Congress rightly presented the 1802 Act as legislation
to reinstate the integrity of the federal judiciary. No Congress has
since been tempted to enact corrupt legislation of the 1801 sort. If
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one should do so, the task for citizen-lawyers and their bar organ-
izations would be to secure its repeal.160
B. Removing a Disabled Judge: The Pickering Case
In 1803, animated in part by overbearing conduct by the remain-
ing Federalist judges, who were proclaimed to be “partial, vindictive,
and cruel,”161 the Jefferson administration set about the task of
removing what some reckoned to be an excess of Federalists among
the federal judiciary whose behavior was thought to be less than
good.162
President Jefferson’s initial step was to recommend Judge
Pickering’s removal.163 Congress impeached him for drunkenness
and unlawful rulings in an admiralty case involving the ship
Eliza.164 In that case, Pickering had ordered the marshal to release
the ship to its owners, who were fellow Federalists, despite the
nonpayment of duties it owed—a default exposing the ship to law-
ful seizure.165 When the United States Attorney pointed out that
Judge Pickering had not yet heard the government’s witnesses, he
was said to have announced drunkenly that “[y]ou may bring forty
thousand [and] they will not alter the decree.”166 He was also
accused of committing unspecified “high crimes and misdemean-
2009] PROVIDING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR JUSTICES 1129
167. ELLIS, supra note 93, at 72.
168. Id. at 72-73; see also BEVERIDGE, supra note 157, at 166.
169. ELLIS, supra note 93, at 74.
170. HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 162, at 211-15.
171. JOHNNY H. KILLIAN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1434-1435 (2004).
172. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 162, at 212.
173. ELLIS, supra note 93, at 75.
ors.”167 The defense contended that his insanity disabled him from
entertaining the criminal intent required to find him guilty of a high
crime or misdemeanor.168 In response to that defense, the Senate
agreed to strike the reference to high crimes, but then found him
guilty on all counts of behavior that was not sufficiently good, and
removed him from office.169
The Federalists had contended that the Article II language
requiring proof of “high crimes or misdemeanors” applicable to
impeachment and removal of executive officers was by implication
applicable as well to Judge Pickering.170 The Senate’s ruling that an
Article III judge can be removed for misconduct not rising to “high
crimes or misdemeanors,” whatever those words might be taken to
mean, stands out, but no federal judge has since been impeached
and removed who was not also found guilty of criminal misconduct.
No worthy government then or now should require its citizens to
submit their disputes for resolution by a drunken Judge Pickering.
Indeed, it is manifestly a violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to subject a citizen to the power of such judges.171
If, as Article III provides, impeachment and removal by Congress is
the only available means of assuring the rights of citizens to have
their cases competently decided, then such judges must be im-
peached. Notwithstanding the enduring practice of referring to
Article III judges as officers enjoying “life tenure,” they do not have
a right to remain in offices that entail duties they cannot or will
not perform.172 They may serve only for the period of their “good
behavior.”173
It was clearly unnecessary, however, to impeach and remove
Judge Pickering. The repealed Act of 1801 provided an unobjection-
able means for removing him, and there existed no sufficient reason
to repeal that provision, or at least not to devise an alternative
method of achieving the humane result of retiring disabled judges
gently, in a nonpunitive manner. On that point, Currie is surely
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179. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 67, at 56-64, 69.
right that the cost of Judge Pickering’s salary is a price worth
paying to avoid a use of the impeachment power to remove a judge
whose misconduct is not sinister but rather the product of his ill
health.174
The failure of Congress in 1802 to address the problem of super-
annuated and otherwise nonperforming judges imposed burdens
and the risk of injustice on randomly selected litigants and lawyers.
Given the system of judicial selection established by Article III,175 it
was inevitable and obvious that some judges would, like Pickering,
hold their offices long after they were intellectually and emotionally
fit to perform the work. And in 1802, it was surely already known
that power tends to corrupt and reinforce the selfish or brutal
instincts of those on whom it is conferred. But oversight of judicial
conduct was left to the appellate process conducted by the itinerant
Justices of the Supreme Court. And not until 1889 was there even
a right of appeal in a criminal case.176 For a century, federal cases
were decided by judges who were often unaccountable for their
rulings, and some of whom were surely disabled and unfit. It was
fortunate that few rights of most citizens in the nineteenth century
depended on their enforcement by federal judges.
In 1891, Congress did at last get around to creating the courts of
appeals.177 The legislation was celebrated by its congressional
proponent as a law ending “the kingly power” of federal judges.178
Until then, the only court reviewing judgments in civil cases was the
Supreme Court with its ever-expanding docket.179 A half-century of
agitation by able and committed citizen-lawyers such as Senator
Evarts and Congressman Culberson was required to persuade
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Congress to establish a right of appeal in criminal cases and a forum
capable of reviewing judgments in civil cases.180
Even in the twentieth century with appellate courts in place to
oversee the exercise of “kingly power,” decrepit or emotionally
disordered judicial behavior occurred, as well as the occasional open
disregard of the applicable law. The recent biography of Judge
Willis Ritter of the Utah District Court tells a tale less extraordi-
nary than many might choose to believe.181 Ritter was appointed in
1950.182 The son of a Utah coal miner, he had been a law professor
at the University of Utah and held a high position in the regional
Office of Price Administration during World War II.183 Former law
professors at Chicago and Harvard recommended Ritter, and he had
prospered in private practice as a tax and estates lawyer, in
addition to serving as political patron and advisor to Utah’s senior
United States Senator, a New Deal Democrat.184 These credentials
almost entitled him to judicial office by the standards of the day.185
His appointment by President Truman was indirectly opposed by
the Mormon hierarchy and by Utah’s junior United States Senator,
a Republican, who launched a serious campaign against his
nomination—based centrally on allegations that, over the years, he
had expressed disapproval of the Constitution and even expressed
Communist sentiments.186 It was also asserted that he had not been
faithful to his wife, and had sometimes manifested a bad temper.187
Ritter was confirmed, but his ill temper was seemingly magnified
by the experience. He proved over the years to be an increasingly
abusive judge who insulted and degraded court staff and the post
office employees with whom he shared a federal office building.188
He was also brutal in his dealings with lawyers and litigants, and
even with fellow federal judges. In 1954, Judge Ritter’s critics, to
lessen his power over them, secured the appointment of a second
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district judge notwithstanding the fact that he had kept a current
docket.189 He strongly resented his “little helper” and attempted to
minimize the role of his colleague through the exercise of his powers
as chief judge.190
Judge Ritter’s personal life also withered. He was brutal in his
disapproval of his daughter’s marriage, and when his wife chastised
him he brought a “girlfriend” to the family farm to meet the
family.191 Though his loyal wife did not divorce him, a formal
separation agreement forced him to leave their home and live
alone.192 First, he lived in the local University Club, but he was
expelled for drunkenly punching the crippled manager for refusing
to serve him another drink after hours.193 Then, he moved into a
hotel room across the street from the courthouse.194 He was also
given to public urination and womanizing.195
By 1972, the mayor of Salt Lake City was prepared to attest that
Judge Ritter was biased against the city.196 In 1976, the Utah Bar
Association was asked to vote to call for Judge Ritter’s removal from
office.197 The contrary prevailing argument was that his removal
would impair the independence of the judiciary.198 But the bar did
agree that his powers as chief judge should not be retained.199 Soon
thereafter, both the State of Utah and the United States Depart-
ment of Justice moved to disqualify him from sitting on any case to
which that government was party.200 When critics were heard to call
for his removal, he likened himself to Edward Coke.201
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Eminent authors David Currie202 and Martin Redish203 have
concluded—from two centuries of Congressional self-restraint in the
exercise of the impeachment power—the principle that the Article
II standard (high crimes or misdemeanors) applies to Article III
impeachments.204 Saikrishna Prakash and Steven Smith have lately
and correctly taken a contrary view, arguing that Congress may
remove a judge whose behavior it deems to be less than good.205
Those authors, much more questionably, encourage Congress to
provide a procedure other than impeachment to exercise that
responsibility independently of the removal power.206
Congress, in due course, took an intermediate position by
gradually delegating increasing power to the federal judiciary to
govern itself with respect to misconduct by its officers. Reform
began in 1922 when Congress created the Judicial Conference of the
United States,207 a body that gradually came to exercise substantial
power over judicial matters.208 The Conference has emerged as the
institution responsible for dealing with disabled or unfit judges.209
On its advice, other reforms followed.210
The problems posed by decrepitude were at last eased in 1939 by
allowing judges or Justices who certified their disability to retire
from regular active duty if their certification was signed by their
chief judge or Justice of the circuit.211 Those who have served for less
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than ten years, such as Judge Pickering, were retired at half pay.212
In 1954, judges and Justices were encouraged to withdraw from full
duty after an extensive period of service.213 The required period of
service varies in length according to their age at the time of
appointment, but they may, at the end of that time, either retire at
full pay, or take senior status.214 Those on senior status remain on
call by their chief judge and generally bear lighter caseloads.215 Most
federal judges take senior status when they become eligible because
they are then empowered to limit their caseloads.216 As a conse-
quence of these reforms, decrepit judges in the district courts or
courts of appeal are seldom a concern. But these reforms did not
address the problem posed by Judge Ritter, who never would have
voluntarily surrendered power.
In 1948, at the suggestion of the Judicial Conference, Congress
delegated some of the responsibility for the oversight of courts to a
Judicial Council in each circuit.217 The 1948 statute provided that
“[e]ach judicial council shall make all necessary orders for the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts within its circuit. The district courts shall promptly carry into
effect all orders of the judicial council.”218 Thus, the district courts
were to be subject to restraints in the exercise of their “kingly
power,”219 but it was not clear what those restraints might be.
In 1965, Alfred Murrah, the Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit and
ex officio chair of its Judicial Council, admirably invoked the 1948
law to relieve District Judge Stephen Chandler of his docket, much
as Judge Pickering had his docket removed by Congress in the 1801
Act.220 The case for doing so was strong, although the contrary
tradition imposed on Judge Murrah a substantial burden of moral
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courage.221 In 1962, Chandler had testified before a United States
Senate subcommittee that he was afraid of being poisoned by
lawyers, that his telephone was tapped, and that his fellow judges
sometimes privately cursed him.222 Twice he had been removed by
writ of mandamus issued by the court of appeals from hearing
lawsuits because of credible “allegations of personal interest or bias
and prejudice.”223 He had barred the United States Attorney in
Oklahoma City and five other Oklahoma City lawyers from
practicing in federal court; each of those rulings had been strongly
overruled by the Court of Appeals in highly critical opinions.224 In
addition, in 1965, an Oklahoma grand jury indicted Chandler on the
charge of conspiring to have his private road paved by the county.225
Murrah’s Tenth Circuit Judicial Council found that he was “unable
or unwilling to discharge efficiently the duties of his office.”226
Judge Chandler petitioned the Supreme Court for an order
restoring his docket.227 The Court, holding that the Council’s order
was interlocutory and not ripe for review, did not reach the merits
of Chandler’s constitutional claim that his removal would violate
Article III.228 Justices Black and Douglas dissented, urging that
“[w]e should stop in its infancy, before it has any growth at all, this
idea that the United States district judges can be made accountable
for their efficiency or lack of it to the judges just over them in the
federal judicial system.”229
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s disposition, the indictment of
Judge Chandler was dismissed and the matter of his incapacity was
settled by assigning him a limited caseload.230 Had he been con-
victed, he would have been subject to impeachment and removal
1136 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1105
231. At least three circuits have held that prosecution of judges can precede impeachment.
See United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Hastings,
681 F.2d 706, 710 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1140-44 (7th Cir.
1974); see also Chandler, 398 U.S. at 140 (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting) (“If they break
a law, they can be prosecuted. If they become corrupt or sit in cases in which they have a
personal or family stake, they can be impeached by Congress.”).
232. COWLEY & NIELSEN, supra note 181, at 286-88.
233. Id. at 301.
234. See The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 76-458, 94
Stat. 2035 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 28 and at 28 U.S.C. § 372
(2000)). For an account of legislation, see Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking under
the Judicial Council’s Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 283 (1982). For a review of practices under the Act, see JUDICIAL CONDUCT & DISABILITY
ACT STUDY COMM., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980:
A REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE (2006), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
publicinfo/breyercommitteereport.pdf.
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Oct. 8, 2002, at A24.
236. McBryde v. Comm’n To Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the
Judicial Conference, 264 F.3d 52, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 821 (2002).
237. Id. The example chosen by the Court of Appeals arose in 1992:
Judge McBryde sanctioned a lawyer appearing before him for failing to have
her client attend a settlement conference in violation of Judge McBryde’s
even under the Article II standard applicable to executive branch
officers.231
Parties and lawyers whose cases were assigned to a judge such as
Judge Ritter or Judge Chandler were right to feel ill-served by the
United States, but the United States itself was ill-served when a
United States Attorney or other federal officials were equally
subject to judicial abuse. The restraint imposed on Judge Chandler
encouraged the Department of Justice to ask the Judicial Council of
the Tenth Circuit to exclude Judge Ritter in Utah from deciding civil
or criminal cases in which the United States was a party.232 Judge
Ritter died before that issue was resolved.233
In 1980, Congress at last explicitly empowered the regional
Judicial Councils to follow the example set by Chief Judge Murrah,
rejecting the advice offered in the dissents of Justices Black and
Douglas.234 Judge John H. McBryde of the Northern District of
Texas soon challenged the 1980 Act.235 McBryde had been the
subject of an extended investigation by a committee of the Fifth
Circuit’s Council.236 In a 159-page report, it recorded his frequent
brutality in his treatment of parties, witnesses, lawyers, and fellow
judges,237 and it recommended that he be publicly reprimanded and
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standard pretrial order, which required all principals to attend the conferences.
Counsel represented a corporation and its employee, defendants in a suit in
which plaintiffs, a woman and her 10-year old daughter, had alleged sexual
harassment. One of the allegations was that the individual defendant “had
terrorized the 10-year old ... by popping out his glass eye and putting it in his
mouth in front of her.” The lawyer thought the presence of the individual
defendant would be counter-productive to settlement efforts; the individual had
no assets and had given her full authority to settle. After chastising the lawyer,
Judge McBryde required that she attend a reading comprehension course and
submit an affidavit swearing to her compliance. The attorney submitted an
affidavit attesting to the fact that she found a course and attended for three
hours a week for five weeks. Judge McBryde challenged her veracity and
required that she submit a supplemental affidavit “listing ‘each day that she was
in personal attendance at a reading comprehension course in compliance with
[the] court’s order; the place where she was in attendance on each date; the
course title of each course; how long she was in attendance on each day; and the
name of a person who can verify her attendance for each day listed.’” She
complied. 
Id. at 67-68 (citation omitted).
238. Id. at 54.
239. Id. at 55.
240. Id. at 68.
241. The Court of Appeals stated:
Thus it seems natural to read Hamilton as seeing the guarantees of life tenure
and undiminished compensation, and the limited means for denying a judge
their protection, simply as assuring independence for the judiciary from the
other branches. The Supreme Court has considered the same passage as Judge
McBryde invokes and so interpreted it: “In our constitutional system,
impeachment was designed to be the only check on the Judicial branch by the
Legislature.”
Id. at 66 (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 235 (1993)).
242. McBryde v. Comm. To Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the
Judicial Conference, 537 U.S. 821 (2002).
243. See Judicial Improvements Act of 2002, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (Supp. 2005).
asked to retire. The Council reprimanded him and relieved him of
his docket for one year.238 Its order was approved by the Committee
of the Judicial Conference, the institution that McBryde then sued
in the District of Columbia.239 The D.C. Court of Appeals upheld the
law and the power conferred on the Judicial Council,240 observing
that the constitutional assurances of job security for judges were
only intended to protect against political intervention by the other
branches of the federal government and were not intended to
immunize judges from judgments by other members of the judicial
branch.241 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.242
In 2002, the 1980 statute was modified as a whole chapter of Title
28 of the United States Code.243 The process now in place explicitly
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authorizes the Circuit Judicial Councils to entertain citizens’
grievances against federal judges regarding judges’ conduct, but
only apart from the substance of any rulings they might make.244
Councils may investigate and conduct hearings in confidence, and
may reimburse a judge for his expenses if he is found to be unjustly
accused of misconduct.245 A Council may order “that, on a temporary
basis for a time certain, no further cases be assigned to the judge
whose conduct is the subject of a complaint.”246 Or it may censure a
judge either privately or by a public pronouncement.247 Or it may
certify his disability or request his voluntary retirement.248 In 2003,
the Judicial Conference recommended that all the circuits post their
disciplinary orders online.249 In 2008, only two had done so.250
The rulings of a Judicial Council may be appealed by the judge or
by a complaining party to a standing committee of the national
Judicial Conference established to review the decisions of judicial
councils.251 A matter may also be referred to the Judicial Conference
for consideration of a reference to the House of Representatives for
possible impeachment and removal.252 But all such actions are
explicitly nonreviewable by conventional civil proceedings.253
The 2002 statute also provides for direct reference to Congress
when a judge is convicted of a felony under state or federal law; the
Judicial Conference may directly refer the matter to Congress for
consideration of possible impeachment and removal.254 Congress,
however, has failed to specify standards of judicial behavior,
notwithstanding repeated efforts of the American Bar Association
(ABA) to express appropriate principles of “good behavior” that
have, over time, found their way into the law of every state.255 In
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257. 28 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
258. Pamela A. MacLean, An Ill-Timed Judicial Reprimand, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 8, 2007 at 5.
259. See Dolph Tillotson, Judge Kent Should Resign, GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, Oct. 10,
2007.
260. Dan Slater, Samuel Kent: First Federal Judge Charged with Federal Sex Crimes, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 29, 2008.
261. Pamela A. MacLean, Questions About Judicial Review After Indictment, NAT’L L.J.,
Sept. 8, 2008, at 6.
262. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIARY CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980 (2007),
supra note 214, at 10.
263. See Editorial, An Inspector General? Rep. James Sensenbrenner’s Proposal To Create
a Watchdog for the Judiciary is a Bad Idea Come Too Soon, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2006, at A16.
264. See Tony Mauro, Binding National Rules Adopted for Handling Judicial Misconduct
1998, the Judicial Conference of the United States did at last adopt
a version that is hortatory, but authorizes regional councils to adopt
local rules.256 The Judicial Conference is empowered by the 2002 Act
to “make its own determination” that impeachment and removal are
appropriate and to refer its decision to Congress.257
Enforcement of standards of judicial conduct in the federal courts
has drawn substantial criticism. In 2007, the Fifth Circuit Council
censured Judge Samuel Kent of Galveston on a finding that he had
sexually harassed a staff member.258 This was at the time deemed
an inadequate response by some.259 And in August 2008, Judge Kent
was indicted on six counts of sexual abuse in violation of federal
law.260 Assuming that the evidence of his guilt was sufficient to
justify his indictment, one might question whether the Council was
too forgiving.261 It seems that he could be impeached and removed
on evidence of the alleged misconduct that fell short of establishing
a certainty justifying a long term in prison.
A 2006 report by a committee chaired by Justice Stephen Breyer
found that a significant number of the grievances filed were
mishandled.262 In that year, Congressman Sensenbrenner proposed
the establishment of an Inspector General whose duty would be to
report judicial misdeeds to Congress.263 In 2008, another Judicial
Conference committee, chaired by Circuit Judge Ralph Winter,
recommended that some national standards be provided by the
Conference.264 Mark Harrison, a leader of an ABA commission
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evaluating the effectiveness of enforcement in state courts of law
governing the behavior of judges, has vigorously protested the lack
of transparency in a process that relies chiefly on private censure.265
Without endorsing its every word, or approving the weak
response of the Conference, we praise this legislation, but wonder
why it took over two centuries to establish a suitable process for
confronting serious judicial misconduct. A shortage of citizen-
lawyers advocating the public interest is the most apparent
explanation—until recent times, lawyers were not courageous
enough to charge a sitting federal judge with misconduct. But at
last, a process now provides occasions for the exercise of disinter-
ested assessment of judicial conduct, and citizen-lawyers should
employ that process and provide the disinterested assessment the
system needs. To be sure, many of the grievances filed against
judges, whether state or federal, are and will continue to be
undeserving of extended notice.
Had such a process been established in 1802 when the Judiciary
Act of 1801 was repealed, it would have served, over the intervening
years, to spare many litigants, lawyers, and lesser officers of the
court of many abuses and injustices at the hands of federal judges
in conditions of physical or psychiatric decline. The process would
have enabled the retirement or removal of the most impaired
judges, but also would have deterred misconduct that was the
product of judicial arrogance, a quality that is probably more likely
to evolve in the minds of judges assured of absolute job security and
vast powers over others.
Indeed, it is not too much to ask of the new system of discipline
that it constrain the misconduct of federal judges in their employ-
ment practices. As Richard Posner and his coauthors have recently
demonstrated, the conduct of judges in hiring law clerks is often
deplorable, and even outrageous.266 The Judicial Conference has
tried to fashion rules to govern that market, but has not been able
to enforce them effectively.267 That can, and should, be changed. No
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judges are engaged in criminal misconduct, but some judges impose
a serious harm on candidates for clerkships and on other judges
interested in recruiting the same candidates. A federal judge who
persists in such misconduct could and should be publicly denounced,
and if that does not work, he or she should be deemed ripe for
impeachment and removal pursuant to Article III.
C. The Impeachment of Justice Chase: Are Justices Different?
In addition to removing Judge Pickering, the Jeffersonian
Congress also considered the removal of Justice Chase.268 They did
not proceed against him at once, although he had plainly abused his
power in Alien and Sedition Act cases.269
In 1803, Justice Chase, in a charge to a grand jury, proclaimed
that the Judiciary Act of 1802, which repealed the Act of 1801, was
unconstitutional, and went on to denounce President Jefferson as
the author of mobocracy that would destroy “peace and order,
freedom and property.”270 This was more than the Jeffersonians
could stand.271 With the concurrence of the President, Congressman
John Randolph initiated articles of impeachment enumerating
Chase’s unjust procedural rulings.272 The House approved his
impeachment.273
In 1805, Chase’s impeachment was tried in the Senate with “lame
duck” Vice President Burr presiding.274 Burr, who had a poisonous
relationship with President Jefferson,275 had also in 1804 killed
Alexander Hamilton in a duel, and had been indicted for murder.276
This event had further magnified both his celebrity and his
disrepute on all sides.277 Over one-thousand spectators attended the
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trial in the new Capitol.278 The defense argued that mere error in
the making of procedural rulings, however grave, is not an
impeachable offense.279 Among the witnesses for Chase was Chief
Justice John Marshall, but his testimony on Chase’s character was
diffident.280 His conduct suggests the possibility that he privately
shared the view that Chase should have been removed.281
As Chief Justice William Rehnquist acknowledged,282 Chase’s
behavior justified his removal. His verbal assault on President
Jefferson alone should have disabled him from thereafter sitting on
matters in which the actions of the President might be brought into
question. Arguably, it was inappropriate to consider that his judicial
decisions on grave public matters could not be reasonably supposed
by informed citizens to be the product of a disinterested assessment
of the facts and law at hand. But his outrageous conduct at the
Callendar trial violated even the rustic standards of the day.283
Randolph provided poor representation of the case for Chase’s
removal. Among other failings, he lost his notes and made a pitifully
bad closing argument.284 Because a few Jeffersonian Senators were
angered by Randolph or thought that the removal of a Federalist
Justice threatened the integrity of the judiciary,285 the Senate could
not quite muster the two-thirds vote to remove Chase.286 It is
reported that all those present were sorry that the proceeding had
even been commenced.287 So Justice Chase remained on the Court
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with Chief Justice Marshall, but constrained himself from further
misdeeds.288
President Jefferson lent no aid to Chase’s removal. He was
furious at Randolph’s ineffectiveness in presenting the case, as well
as over other matters,289 and perhaps sought to reduce partisan
frictions. He later declared that the impeachment process was a
“farce” requiring a constitutional amendment to correct an error in
our Constitution, which made “any branch independent of the
nation.”290 The failure to remove Justice Chase was a serious failure
of the duty of Congress to act as a “check and balance” to correct
gross abuse of power by a Justice. Prakash and Smith are surely
correct that the mere failure to exercise the power to impeach and
remove Chase does not tell us the meaning of the constitutional
text.291
The failure to remove Chase might be seen as a consequence of
the extreme hostility dividing the parties in the Senate, hostility
that may have evoked a hope of resolution by a few Democratic-
Republican Senators.292 Leaving Chase on the Court might indeed
have served President Madison’s later term in office by reducing the
animus and mistrust of the Federalists toward him.293
The best result in the Chase case would have been achieved if
Federalist politicians had joined Randolph in presenting the case
against him. Perhaps Chief Justice Marshall’s diffident testimony
was an attempt to make the dispute less partisan. If he had been
more direct in doing so, he would deserve a special salute. We could
then point to his conduct in the Chase case as a role model for
disinterested citizen-lawyers who, without regard for their partisan
connections, could and should have agreed that Chase was unfit for
the office he held. For that reason, and not because he was a
Federalist, he should have been impeached and removed.
Where, indeed, were the citizen-lawyers among the Federalists in
the Senate? Why did they wait until after the inauguration of
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President Jefferson to impeach and remove Chase? Had they
removed him when he should have been removed, at the time when,
as lame ducks, they were enacting the Judiciary Act of 1801, that
legislation would have acquired an entirely different hue. The
explanation lies, in large measure, on the intense and inappropriate
partisan loyalty of Federalists to one of their own. That sentiment
should have been cast aside by those practicing the classical civic
virtue of citizen-lawyers.
1. How To Remove A Justice
It is hard to identify a Justice who has sat on the Supreme Court
in the ensuing two centuries who equaled Samuel Chase in his
departure from the standard of “good behavior” by openly abusing
his or her power. But there have been numerous others who have
violated the standard expressed by Lord Coke294 because they ceased
to perform their job. Indeed, this has been a recurring problem.
The problems of power-crazed abuse of lawyers and litigants, such
as that exhibited by Judge Ritter,295 are less likely to occur in a
multi-judge court. Often, the members of the Supreme Court have
found ways to diminish harm resulting from a single Justice’s
mental disabilities. The requirement of circuit riding imposed by the
original Judiciary Act of 1789 long deterred some Justices from
clinging to their office when they could not perform its duties.296
Also, for a time, it was traditional for Justices to designate one of
their colleagues to advise a senior member of the Court when his
time for retirement had come.297
In the twentieth century, the burden of being a Supreme Court
Justice was greatly diminished. Circuit riding was abolished in
1891.298 In 1925, the Justices were empowered to exercise substan-
tial control over their workload,299 a power extended to be almost
absolute in 1988.300 Their quarters were moved from the basement
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of the Capitol building to the most pretentious building in the
capital city,301 and Justices were provided with abundant staff
support to whom much of their work can be delegated.302
Also in the second half of the twentieth century, the Court’s
political role increased to the point that many Justices became
increasingly reluctant to surrender their vast power, regardless of
their physical or mental condition. Some who were able to continue
the work resigned from office to avoid a risk that their successor
might be named by a politically uncongenial President.303 Very few
have accepted the benefits offered to senior judges, apparently
because being a Justice is too gratifying and entails too little work
to induce voluntary retirement. In 2000, David Garrow reviewed
numerous cases of serious debilitation of Justices and urged a
constitutional amendment to address the problem of mental
decrepitude.304 Nonconstitutional remedies have also been offered
in recent years: variable term limits,305 age limits,306 and even a
“golden parachute.”307
Justices who do not do their job or who use their office for
personal advantage commit the two unforgivable sins identified by
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Edward Coke.308 Their removal is an important and sometimes
urgent public business. Surely the Constitution should not be read
to prevent that result, so long as the process employed to reach it
engages the legislative process309 and is designed to exclude or
minimize the possibility that the removal is pursued for partisan
political reasons. Disinterested citizen-lawyers have a duty to
promote a process that would function without regard to the
political connections of a Justice whose behavior or failure to
perform the office is reasonably questioned.
Consider the possibility that the Republican Congress could have
removed Chief Justice Rehnquist when he was plainly disabled, as
he was in 2005 and 2006. Or perhaps whether citizen-lawyers
should have raised the question of his retirement earlier, when, for
a time, he was suffering from substance addiction resulting from a
prescribed medication?310 Was it not a duty of the citizen-lawyer to
support a request for his retirement as an act needed to support the
independence of the judiciary and the integrity of the law? Indeed,
where was the organized bar at that time? Is it not unprofessional
to prolong and protect the careers of Justices who are no longer
doing their jobs? The profession has been, in recent decades, quite
responsible in establishing standards of judicial conduct and
systems for their enforcement in state courts and very recently in
the Judicial Conference.311 But why are there no standards that
apply to Justices?
To acknowledge that Congress is responsible for the removal of
Justices who are unable or unwilling to practice “good behavior” is
not to join Gerald Ford in asserting that the standard for removal
of a Justice is whatever the House of Representatives deems it to
be.312 Congress is a political body that cannot make disinterested,
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317. Thus, serious questions were raised about the integrity of the prosecution of Judge
nonpartisan assessments of the capacities of Justices. But it would
be appropriate for Congress to establish reasonable standards of
judicial conduct applicable to Justices but unrelated to the sub-
stance of their decisions. It is a task for citizen-lawyers and the
organized bar to guide Congress in establishing a process placing
the primary responsibility for the enforcement of those standards
with an appropriate and disinterested institution whose advice
would command its respect.
Congress exercised this responsibility in 2002 by creating the
Judicial Council process described earlier.313 A similar process is
needed to discipline nonperforming Justices. Who, the reader is
likely to ask, might be qualified to judge a Justice? The Judicial
Conference of the United States is the obvious choice, were it not for
the fact that the chairman of the Conference is ex officio the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court.314 That arrangement, made in 1922
at the suggestion of Chief Justice Taft, has never been seriously
reconsidered by the Conference or by Congress. A secondary effect
of the steady enlargement of the power of the Conference has been
the empowerment of the Chief Justice personally; as with Justices,
no system of accountability applies to his conduct. Judith Resnik
has made the case for separation of the two offices.315 There is in fact
little reason for them to be united.316 But if her arguments cannot
find traction in a passive Congress, another alternative is needed.
Creating a special forum to judge Justices that would be compara-
ble to the judicial councils of each circuit and of the review commit-
tee of the Judicial Conference is a complex but not impossible task.
The judges who judge Justices cannot be selected by the same
President who would select the Justice who would fill the position
of a Justice found to be unfit; the presidential judgment would be
tainted by self-interest. Nor can they be judged by officers of the
Department of Justice, an institution litigating before the Court on
a daily basis.317 Neither can the special forum consist of other
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Justices or be selected by them because of the mistrust this would
generate among sitting Justices. Those who judge Justices would
have to be mature judges; indeed, so mature that they have no hope
of appointment to the Court, but not so mature that they are
themselves decrepit.
A council of judges can be identified who share all these requisite
qualities. They are the chief judges of the thirteen courts of appeals.
Chief judges are senior among their colleagues, but not too senior,
for they are required to surrender their administrative duties at the
age of seventy.318 If thirteen is thought to be too large a panel,
diverse methods of random selection might be established to reduce
that number. For example, some form of rotation that alternated
membership annually so that the responsibility is never imposed for
long on any members of that group.
Such a Council of Chief Judges could be empowered by Congress
to exercise over Justices the powers that circuit councils exercise
over circuit and district judges. The Council of Chief Judges could
receive complaints from citizen-lawyers and be empowered to order
“that, on a temporary basis for a time certain,” the Justice deemed
unfit to hold office shall sit on no cases.319 Like other councils
addressing the judges that they judge, such a council might be
empowered to censure a Justice either privately or by a public
pronouncement for conduct seriously violating the standards of good
judicial behavior enacted by Congress. Or it might certify a Justice’s
disability or request his voluntary retirement. Or in extreme
circumstances, it might refer a case to the House of Representatives
for possible impeachment and removal.
How might such a Council of Chief Judges inform itself about the
mental health and physical condition of the Justices? There is
presently, as noted, consideration of the establishment of an
Inspector General within the Judiciary, not unlike other inspectors
general in the federal government.320 Such an officer, if established,
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might, among other duties, provide the Council with a modest
investigative arm. Alternatively, the chief judges might rotate that
responsibility among their thirteen-member group. If issues of fact
arose, a confidential hearing might be held.
What difference would such an institution make? It could have
resulted in the earlier termination of numerous Justices’ careers.
Most earlier terminations would occur voluntarily to avoid a
discernible risk that one might reasonably be identified as unfit for
the office one is holding. Such an institution might also deter some
other forms of judicial conduct that falls short of good behavior, such
as a Justice’s failure to recuse himself from deciding a case in which
he or she has a financial or other significant interest.
For example, Chief Justice Marshall’s conduct in the celebrated
1819 case of McCulloch v. Maryland321 might have been different
and less subject to criticism from lawyers striving to impose
appropriate moral standards on the judiciary. In that case, Mary-
land sued a cashier of the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the
United States to collect a tax imposed by its legislature on all banks
doing business in the state.322 The United States resisted the tax
and challenged the power of Maryland to tax federal instrumentali-
ties; Maryland in reply challenged the power of the United States
to establish a bank.323 Marshall, for a unanimous Court, published
a thirty-seven-page opinion, not only confirming the position of the
United States, but also laying an important stone in the develop-
ment of the legal relationship between the nation and the states.324
McCulloch attracted strong criticism on the merits. Critics
accused Marshall and the Court of gross professional misconduct in
misusing the indeterminacy of the constitutional text to achieve his
political aim of denying sovereignty to the states and usurping the
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power and responsibility of legislative bodies.325 The critics were
surely correct that the opinion went well beyond the needs of the
case. Congress had not forbidden states to tax the Bank except by
loose implication; a more defensible decision would have been to
uphold the state’s power to tax until Congress otherwise explicitly
immunized the Bank.326 Congress was at pains to avoid providing
any such immunity when the time came to extend the Bank’s
charter. As his critics recognized, Marshall’s holding went far in
embedding nationalism in the literature of the legal profession.327
Marshall, in 1832, privately expressed his astonishment that the
Union had lasted as long as it had.328 But he would soon see
President Andrew Jackson, who was not a Federalist, invoke his
reasoning in McCulloch when Jackson relied on Marshall’s opinion
as establishing the popular source of constitutional legitimacy, and
empowering him to ignore South Carolina’s attempt to nullify a
federal tax.329
Another more serious problem with the decision in McCulloch
was the fact that the Chief Justice was significantly invested in the
Bank.330 He was an original owner of at least ten shares when the
Bank opened in 1817.331 He continued to buy shares in 1818 and,
with his wife and brother’s estate, owned forty shares in 1819, when
he sold five shares and transferred some to other members of his
family to be held in trust for his wife.332 These transactions occurred
while the case was pending in the Supreme Court.333 The decision
of the Maryland court had diminished the value of this investment
2009] PROVIDING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR JUSTICES 1151
334. Id. at 731.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 732 (citing Hunter v. Fairfax’s Devisee, 15 Va. (2 Mont.) 90 (1796), reargued
1809).
337. See Noonan, supra note 330.
338. Id.
339. ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (4 vols. 1916-17).
340. Id. at 736.
341. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices’ Conflicts Halt Apartheid Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
by one-third; the decision in McCulloch restored its value.334 The
capital gain to himself and his family was roughly one-and-one-half
times his annual salary as Chief Justice.335
The duty to recuse himself was well-recognized at the time. St.
George Tucker had recused himself in a previous case in which his
stake was much less than that of Marshall.336 There was no public
knowledge at the time of Marshall’s behavior, but the facts surfaced
in 1837 in the debate on the renewal of the Bank’s charter.337 By
that time, Marshall had repossessed the shares he had
transferred.338 His admirers and political supporters sought to
conceal the facts, as did his twentieth-century biographer, Albert
Beveridge.339 John Noonan explained Marshall’s behavior:
Marshall was committed to the cause of a national bank.
Personally, a family investment was at issue. He did not want to
abandon either the cause or the investment; so he did not recuse
himself and he did not effectively dispose of the interest.
Believing that the political cause rightly affected his views,
strongly conscious of inner rectitude, and knowing that there
was no power on earth to call him to account, he would not have
hesitated to believe that he could judge fairly on the merits.340
Judge Noonan is clearly correct that such conduct, even on the part
of one of our most admired Justices, was both a disgrace and a
product of the Justice’s sense of invulnerability. Had a system been
in place to hold the Chief Justice accountable for his misconduct, it
probably would not have occurred. Justices today often recuse
themselves in situations such as that faced by Chief Justice
Marshall, but there may be other forms of inappropriate conduct
that ought to be deterred by an appropriate form of accountability
for Justices similar to that to which federal judges of lower rank,
and virtually all state judges, are subject.341
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The presence of such a process might also have encouraged a
number of Justices to retire when the period of their service brought
them to an age when ordinary Americans retire, because their
energy and creativity had begun a steady decline. And none would
have remained on the Court when impairments of health and age
had resulted in substantial physical and mental deterioration.
Instead, many would leave office in a more timely way if they faced
a disinterested assessment of their professional competence.
CONCLUSION
Congress should enact legislation providing for the chastisement
of Justices or for their removal from office by impeachment on the
advice of a panel of independent chief circuit judges in accordance
with legislated standards requiring Justices to perform their duties
and to abstain from using their powers to benefit themselves. Such
legislation is long overdue, violates no valid application of Article III
of the Constitution, and would serve to maintain, in the minds of
Justices, an awareness of their accountability to their profession.
That cause merits the continued support of citizen-lawyers striving
to maintain the independence of the federal judiciary.
